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a b s t r a c t
Justification logic studies epistemic and provability phenomena by introducing justifica-
tions/proofs into the language in the form of justification terms. Pure justification logics
serve as counterparts of traditionalmodal epistemic logics, and hybrid logics combine epis-
temic modalities with justification terms. The computational complexity of pure justifica-
tion logics is typically lower than that of the corresponding modal logics. Moreover, the
so-called reflected fragments, which still contain complete information about the respec-
tive justification logics, are known to be in NP for a wide range of justification logics, pure
and hybrid alike. This paper shows that, under reasonable additional restrictions, these re-
flected fragments are NP-complete, thereby proving a matching lower bound. The proof
method is then extended to provide a uniform proof that the corresponding full pure jus-
tification logics areΠp2 -hard, reproving and generalizing an earlier result by Milnikel.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Justification logic is an emerging field that studies provability, knowledge, and belief via explicit proofs or justifications
that are part of the language. A justification logic is essentially a refined analogue of a modal epistemic logic. Whereas the
latter uses F to indicate that F is known to be true, a justification logic uses t : F instead, where t is a term that describes
a ‘justification’ or proof of F . This construction enables justification logics to reason about both formulas and proofs at the
same time, avoiding the need to treat provability at the metalevel.
Because justification logic can reason directly about explicit proofs, it providesmore concrete and constructive analogues
of modal epistemic logics. For example, the modal distribution axiom (F → G)→ (F → G) is replaced in justification
logic by the axiom s : (F → G) → (t : F → (s · t) : G). The latter replaces the distribution axiom with a computationally
explicit construction. Justification logics are very promising for the structural proof theory and have already proved to
be fruitful in finding new approaches to common knowledge [4,12], the Logical Omniscience Problem [7,8], and self-
referentiality of proofs [22]. For further discussion on the various applications of justification logic, see [6].
The goal of the present paper1 is to provide a uniform method of proving lower bounds for the Derivability Problems in
various justification logics and their reflected fragments by reduction from problems similar to the Vertex Cover Problem.
We begin by reviewing some definitions of justification logics.
The historically first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs LP, was introduced by Sergei Artemov [2] to provide a
provability semantics for the modal logic S4 (see also [3]). The language of LP
F ::= p | ⊥ | (F → F) | t :F ,
t ::= x | c | (t · t) | (t + t) | ! t
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Table 1
Axioms for justification logics.
Justification axiom scheme Present in logics
A4 t :F → F JT, LP
A5 t :F → ! t : t :F J4, JD4, LP
A7 t :⊥ → ⊥ JD, JD4
contains an additional operator t : F , read ‘term t serves as a justification/proof of formula F .’ Here p stands for a sentence
letter, x for a justification variable, and c for a justification constant. Formulas of the form t :F are called justification assertions.
Statements t : F can be seen as refinements of modal statements F because the latter say that F is known, whereas
the former additionally provide a rationale for such knowledge. This relationship is demonstrated through the recursively
defined operation of forgetful projection that maps justification formulas to modal formulas: (t :F)◦ = (F ◦), and commutes
with Boolean connectives: (F → G)◦ = F ◦ → G◦, where p◦ = p and⊥◦ = ⊥.
Axioms and rules of LP:
A1. A complete axiomatization of classical propositional logic by finitely many axiom schemes; rule modus ponens;
A2. Application Axiom s :(F → G)→ (t :F → (s · t) :G);
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s :F → (s+ t) :F , t :F → (s+ t) :F ;
A4. Factivity Axiom t :F → F ;
A5. Positive Introspection Axiom t :F → ! t : t :F ;
R4. Axiom Internalization Rule
c :A ,
where A is an axiom of LP and c is a justification constant.
LP is the exact counterpart of S4 (note the similarity of their axioms): namely, let X◦ = {F ◦ | F ∈ X} for a set X of
justification formulas and let LP be identified with the set of its theorems, then
Theorem 1 (Realization Theorem, [2,3]). LP◦ = S4.
Other epistemic modal logics have their own justification counterparts in the same sense. Counterparts of the modal
logics K,D, T, K4, andD4were developed by Vladimir Brezhnev in [11]. These justification logics, named J, JD, JT, J4, and JD4
respectively, are all subsystems of LP and share the A1–A3 portion of its axiom system. The remaining two axiom schemes
are included dependent on whether or not their forgetful projections are axioms of the respective modal logic. In addition,
JD and JD4 require a new axiom scheme2:
A7. Consistency t :⊥ → ⊥,
whose forgetful projection is the modal Seriality Axiom. Complete details can be found in Table 1.
Finally, the rule R4 for J4 and JD4 is written the same way as for LP, but of course it now applies to the axioms of J4,
respectively JD4. The logics without the Positive Introspection Axiom A5 still require some restricted form of positive
introspection for constants which is embedded into the Axiom Internalization Rule:
R4!. Axiom Internalization Rule ! ! · · ·!  
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A ,
where A is an axiom of the logic, c is a justification constant, and n ≥ 0 is an integer.
This form of the Axiom Internalization Rule is used for J, JD, and JT.
Theorem 2 (Realization Theorem, [11]).
J◦ = K, JD◦ = D, JT◦ = T,
J4◦ = K4, JD4◦ = D4.
All these justification logics are pure in the sense that only terms are present in the language, but not modalities. In [4],
Artemov studied hybrid3 justification logics TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP. These combine termswithmodalities for several agents
(a single-agent variant S41LPwas originally developed by Artemov jointly with Elena Nogina, see [9]).
Axioms and rules of TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP:
LetML ∈ {T,S4,S5}.
2 The apparent break in the numeration of axioms is due to the Negative Introspection Axiom A6 that remains outside the scope of this paper. The
numbering of rules follows [5].
3 The term ‘‘hybrid justification logic’’ is used here differently from [16], where it is a hybrid of hybrid logic and a justification logic, whereas in our case
it is a hybrid of a modal logic and a justification logic.
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1. Axioms and rules of the multimodal logicMLn.
2. Axioms and rules of the justification logic LP.
3. Connection axiom. For each i = 1, . . . , n, t :F → iF .
The Axiom Internalization Rule R4 in 2. is extended to apply to all axioms ofMLnLP.
For some applications (e.g., to avoid Logical Omniscience [7] or to study self-referentiality [22]) the use of constants needs
to be restricted; this is achieved using constant specifications. A constant specification CS for a justification logic JL is a set of
instances of the rule R4 for this logic:
CS ⊆ {c :A | A is an axiom of JL, c is a justification constant}.
Given a constant specification CS for JL, the logic JLCS is the result of replacing the Axiom Internalization Rule in JL
(R4 or R4!) by its relativized version, respectively by:
R4CS .
c :A ∈ CS
c :A ;
R4!CS .
c :A ∈ CS
! ! · · · !  
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A , where n ≥ 0 is an integer.
The Realization Theorem holds for a pure justification logic JLwith a constant specificationCS, i.e., (JLCS)◦ = ML = JL◦,
iff CS is axiomatically appropriate:
Definition 3. A constant specification CS for a logic JL is called:
• axiomatically appropriate4 if every axiom of JL is justified by at least one constant;
• schematic5 if each constant justifies several (maybe 0) axiom schemes and only them;
• schematically injective6 if it is schematic and each constant justifies no more than one axiom scheme.
The following is the fundamental property of justification logics, closely related to the Realization Theorem:
Lemma 4 (Constructive Necessitation [2,4,5]). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for a justification
logic JL. For any theorem F of JLCS , there exists a+-free ground7 justification term s such that JLCS ⊢ s :F .
Whereas it is well known that the Derivability Problems for the modal logics K, D, T, K4, D4, and S4 are PSPACE-
complete [23], it was shown that
Theorem 5 ([19,21,1]). Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} and CS be an axiomatically appropriate and schematic constant
specification8 for JL. Then the Derivability Problem for JLCS is inΠ
p
2 .
In particular, LP itself is inΠp2 .
Remark 6. The restriction on the constant specification being axiomatically appropriate in the preceding theorem is not
necessary for J, JT, J4, and LP.




2 -hard provided CS is axiomatically appropriate and schematically injective;
2. J4CS isΠ
p
2 -hard provided CS is axiomatically appropriate and schematic.
The so-called reflected fragment rLP of the Logic of Proofs was studied by Nikolai Krupski in [18].
Definition 8. For any justification logic JLCS with a constant specification CS, the reflected fragment of the logic consists of
all provable justification assertions:
rJLCS = {t :F | JLCS ⊢ t :F}.
We will write rJLCS ⊢ t : F to mean t : F ∈ rJLCS . At the end of this section, we will present an axiomatization for several
reflected fragments via ∗-calculi, which would make the use of ⊢more natural.
A reflected fragment bears complete information about the underlying logic as the following theorem shows:
4 The term is due to Melvin Fitting.
5 The term is due to Robert Milnikel although the idea goes back to Alexey Mkrtychev.
6 The term is due to Milnikel.
7 A justification term is called ground if it contains no occurrences of justification variables.
8 In all complexity results, we always assume CS to be polynomial-time decidable.
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Table 2
∗-Calculi.
Calculus Axioms and rules Used for
∗CS ∗CS! , ∗A2, ∗A3 rJCS , rJDCS , rJTCS
∗!CS ∗CS, ∗A2, ∗A3, ∗A5 rJ4CS , rJD4CS , rLPCS , rTnLPCS , rS4nLPCS , rS5nLPCS
Theorem 9 ([18,21]). Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, TnLP,S4nLP,S5nLP} and CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant
specification for JL. Then
JLCS ⊢ F ⇐⇒ (∃t)rJLCS ⊢ t :F .
(The requirement of axiomatic appropriateness is necessary only for the=⇒-direction.)
The =⇒-direction constitutes the Constructive Necessitation Property (Lemma 4). The⇐=-direction easily follows from
the Factivity Axiom A4 for all logics but J, JD, J4, and JD4 that do not have Factivity. For these four logics, the statement can
be proved semantically using F-models (see [15] for their description) or syntactically by transforming a derivation of t : F
in the respective ∗-calculus into a derivation of F in the underlying justification logic (the details of this transformation can
be found in [21, proof of Lemma 3.4.10]).
Theorem 10 ([18,21]). Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, TnLP,S4nLP,S5nLP} and CS be a schematic constant specification
for JL. The Derivability Problem for rJLCS , the reflected fragment of JLCS , is in NP.
To prove Theorem 10 for rLPCS , N. Krupski developed an axiomatization for rLPCS that we will call the ∗!CS-calculus.
Axioms and rules of the ∗!CS-calculus:
∗CS. Axioms: for any c :A ∈ CS, c :A;
∗A2. Application Rule s :(F → G) t :F
s · t :G ;
∗A3. Sum Rule s :F
s+ t :F ,
t :F
s+ t :F ;
∗A5. Positive Introspection Rule t :F! t : t :F .
In [21], this calculus was shown to also axiomatize the logics rJ4CS , rJD4CS , rTnLPCS , rS4nLPCS , and rS5nLPCS . In particular,
the three logics LPCS , J4CS , and JD4CS all use the ∗!CS-calculus to axiomatize their reflected fragments. The reflected
fragments rJCS , rJDCS , and rJTCS of the three theories which do not have positive introspection are all axiomatized by
the ∗CS-calculuswhich is obtained by omitting the rule ∗A5 from the ∗!CS-calculus while simultaneously extending the set
of axioms to include:
∗CS!. Axioms: for any c :A ∈ CS and any integer n ≥ 0, ! ! · · · !  
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A.
Note that axioms ∗CS are instances of ∗CS! with n = 0. Therefore, ∗CS can be used both in the ∗CS- and the ∗!CS-calculi.
We collectively call the ∗CS- and the ∗!CS-calculi the ∗-calculi, which are summarized in Table 2. As can be seen from
the preceding discussion and the summarizing table, there are only two calculi that axiomatize the reflected fragments of
various pure and hybrid justification logics. More precisely, the rules of the ∗-calculus for a given justification logic JLCS
depend solely on whether JL enjoys full positive introspection while the axioms of this ∗-calculus are read from CS and
thus indirectly depend on the axioms of JL.
In Theorem 37 below, we will show that the same rules can be used in the setting where there are non-logical axioms in
addition to the ∗CS or ∗CS! axioms.
The first main result of the present paper, Theorem 33, is a lower bound on the complexity of reflected fragments
that matches the upper bound of Theorem 10; namely, we show that the Derivability Problems for many reflected
fragments are NP-complete. The proof is by a many–one polynomial-time reduction from a known NP-complete problem,
the Vertex Cover Problem. As in Milnikel’s lower bound for LPCS , we have to impose an additional restriction that CS be
axiomatically appropriate and schematically injective. The reduction method is then extended to establish a lower bound
on the complexity of full pure justification logics that also matches the upper bound of Theorem 5; this gives a reproof of
theΠp2 -hardness results of [24] and extends the results to additional justification logics.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines a coding of graphs by propositional formulas and shows how the
existence of a vertex cover can be described in terms of these formulas. Section 3 develops justification terms that encode
several standard methods of propositional reasoning. Although the formulas that describe the existence of a vertex cover
depend on the cover itself rather than only on its size, Section 4 shows how to eliminate this dependency by using the terms
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fromSection 3 to encode particular derivations of the formulas fromSection 2. Section 5 finishes the proof of the polynomial-
time reduction. This reduction is used in Section 6 to establish a criterion for NP-hardness of reflected fragments and to apply
it to a wide range of them. Section 7 lays the groundwork for proving lower bounds for full pure justification logics, which
is done in Section 8 by generalizing the Vertex Cover Problem to a Πp2 -complete version. Finally, Section 9 explores the
restrictions on the constant specification necessary for the proved lower bounds.
2. Graph coding and preliminaries
A graph G = ⟨V , E⟩ has a finite set V of vertices and a finite set E of undirected edges. We assume w.l.o.g. that
V = {1, . . . ,N} for some N and represent an edge e between vertices k and l as the set e = {k, l} with its endpoints
denoted by v1(e) < v2(e). A vertex cover for G is a set C of vertices such that each edge e ∈ E has at least one endpoint in C .
The Vertex Cover (VC) Problem is the problem of determining whether a given graph G has a vertex cover of a size≤ L for a
given integer L ≥ 0. The Vertex Cover Problem is one of the classic NP-complete problems.
We define below formulas FV , FC , and FG that will help build a many–one reduction from VC to the reflected fragments
of justification logics. These formulas will include large conjunctions. To avoid the dependence of derivations on a vertex
cover, we will use balanced conjunctions (see [10]):
Definition 11. Each formula is a balanced conjunction of depth 0. If A and B are both balanced conjunctions of depth k, then
A ∧ B is a balanced conjunction of depth k+ 1.
Clearly, a balanced conjunction of depth k is also a balanced conjunction of depth l for any 0 ≤ l ≤ k. Thus, we are mainly
interested in howdeeply a given formula is conjunctively balanced. Unless stated otherwise, for any conjunction C1∧· · ·∧C2k
of 2k formulas, we assume that the omitted parentheses are such that the resulting balanced conjunction has the maximal
possible depth, i.e., depth≥ k.
We also need to refer to Ci’s that form a conjunction C1∧· · ·∧C2k . The following inductive definition of depth k conjuncts,
or simply k-conjuncts, generalizes the definition of conjuncts in an ordinary conjunction:
Definition 12. Each formula is a 0-conjunct of itself. If C ∧ D is a k-conjunct of a formula F , then C and D are both (k+ 1)-
conjuncts of F .
For instance, the conjuncts of an ordinary conjunction are its 1-conjuncts; all Ci’s in C1 ∧ · · · ∧ C2k are its k-conjuncts. More
generally, any balanced conjunction of depth k has exactly 2k occurrences of k-conjuncts (with possibly several occurrences
of the same formula).
To make a full use of balanced conjunctions, it is convenient to restrict attention to instances of the Vertex Cover
Problem for graphs in which both the number of vertices and the number of edges are powers of 2. These are called binary
exponential graphs. It is also helpful to only consider vertex coverswhose size is a power of 2; thesewe call binary exponential
vertex covers. Fortunately, the version of the Vertex Cover Problem restricted to binary exponential graphs and their binary
exponential vertex covers is also NP-complete:
Theorem 13. The Binary Vertex Cover (BVC) Problem of determining whether a given binary exponential graph G has a vertex
cover of size≤ 2l for a given integer l ≥ 0 is NP-complete.
Proof. Since each instance of BVC is also an instance of the standard VC problem, and since VC is NP-complete, it suffices
to construct a polynomial-time many–one reduction from VC to BVC. Suppose we are given an instance of VC; namely, we
are given a graph G0 and an integer L and wish to determine if G0 has a vertex cover of size≤ L. We give a polynomial-time
procedure that constructs a binary exponential graph G and a value l so that G0 has a vertex cover of size ≤ L iff G has a
vertex cover of size≤ 2l. The graph G is constructed in three stages; each stage causes only a constant factor increase in the
size of the graph.
Stage 1. Increasing the size of vertex covers. Choose an integer 0 ≤ L′ < L such that L+ L′ = 2l − 1 for some integer l ≥ 0. A
graph G′ = ⟨V ′, E ′⟩ is obtained from G0 by adding 2L′ new vertices broken into L′ disjoint pairs with the vertices in each pair
joined by a new edge (L′ new edges overall). The graph G0 has a vertex cover of size ≤ L iff the graph G′ has a vertex cover
of size≤ 2l − 1.
Stage 2. Increasing the number of edges. Choose an integer 0 < M ′′ ≤ |E ′| such that |E ′| +M ′′ = 2m for some integerm ≥ 0.
A graph G′′ = ⟨V ′′, E ′′⟩ is obtained by adding M ′′ + 1 new vertices to G′ with one of these vertices joined to all M ′′ others
(M ′′ new edges overall). The graph G′ has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l − 1 iff the graph G′′ has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l.
Stage 3. Increasing the number of vertices. Choose an integer 0 ≤ N ′′′ < |V ′′| such that |V ′′| + N ′′′ = 2k for some integer
k ≥ 0. A graph G = G′′′ is obtained by adding N ′′′ isolated vertices to G′′. The graph G′′ has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l iff the
graph G′′′ has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l.
It is clear from the construction that G is a binary exponential graph such that G0 has a vertex cover of size≤ L iff G has
a vertex cover of size≤ 2l. 
Definition 14. Let G = ⟨V , E⟩ be a binary exponential graph with E = {e1, . . . , e2m}. We define the following formulas:
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a. For each edge ei = {i1, i2} ∈ E, where i1 < i2, Fe = pi1 ∨ pi2 = pv1(e) ∨ pv2(e).
b. Let C = {i1, i2, . . . , i2l} ⊆ V be a possible binary exponential vertex cover for G, where i1 < i2 < · · · < i2l . Define
FC = pi1 ∧ · · · ∧ pi2l .
c. FG = Fe1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fe2m .
The proof of the following properties is an easy exercise (⊢ denotes derivability in classical propositional logic):
Lemma 15. For any binary exponential graph G = ⟨V , E⟩ and any binary exponential set C ⊆ V ,
1. ⊢ FV → FG;
2. ⊢ FV → FC ;
3. ⊢ FC → FG iff C is a vertex cover for G.
Our goal is to reduce BVC to derivability in a given reflected fragment. To this end, we consider a particular derivation
of FV → FG that proceeds by first proving FV → FC , then attempting to prove FC → FG, succeeding in the attempt iff C is
a vertex cover, and finally applying hypothetical syllogism (HS) to infer FV → FG. We further encode this derivation as a
justification term t so that rJLCS ⊢ t :(FV → FG) iff C is a vertex cover. In BVC we need to determine whether there exists a
vertex cover of (at most) a given size rather than whether a given set of vertices is a vertex cover. Thus, t :(FV → FG) should
not depend on C butmay (and should) depend on the size of C . Since C has already been ‘‘syllogized away’’ from the formula
FV → FG, it remains to make sure that the term t only depends on the size of C . Although any derivations of FV → FC and of
FC → FG necessarily explicitly depend on C , the terms encoding them, and therefore t , can be made independent of C . This
is the main reason why we use balanced conjunctions: this way all k-conjuncts are interchangeable.
Instead of giving a proof for one particular type of reflected fragments and explaining how to adjust it to other cases as
in [13], we will now formulate conditions under which a reflected fragment fits our construction. These conditions have the
following form: for certain individual axiom schemes or their sets there must exist a term that justifies exactly the axioms
from this scheme or this set of schemes respectively.
Definition 16. A reflected fragment rJLCS is called fitting if it has ground terms c1, c2, c∧1,∧2, c∧, and c∨1,∨2with the following
properties:
rJLCS ⊢ c1 : F ⇐⇒ F ≡ (X → (Y → X)),
rJLCS ⊢ c2 : F ⇐⇒ F ≡ ((X → (Y → Z))→ ((X → Y )→ (X → Z))),
rJLCS ⊢ c∧1,∧2 : F ⇐⇒ F ≡ (X1 ∧ X2 → Xi), where i = 1 or i = 2,
rJLCS ⊢ c∧ : F ⇐⇒ F ≡ (X → (Y → X ∧ Y )),
rJLCS ⊢ c∨1,∨2 : F ⇐⇒ F ≡ (Xi → X1 ∨ X2), where i = 1 or i = 2,
(1)
where X , Y , Z , X1, and X2 are arbitrary formulas.
Most natural schematically injective constant specifications for justification logics yield fitting reflected fragments. Note
that terms c1, c2, and c∧ should justify exactly one commonly used propositional axiom scheme each. In fact, if these
axiom schemes are part of A1 for a particular justification logic JL and if CS is schematically injective, these terms may
have an especially simple form: they can be constants justifying their respective axiom schemes. The two terms c∧1,∧2
and c∨1,∨2 should justify two commonly used axiom schemes each. In general, they can be modeled by the sums of terms
corresponding to those axiom schemes. That is to say, c∧1,∧2 can be defined to be c∧1 + c∧2, where c∧i justifies exactly the
scheme X1 ∧ X2 → Xi. Similarly, c∨1,∨2 can generally be set equal to c∨1 + c∨2 for appropriate terms c∨1 and c∨2.
We shall prove the NP-hardness of fitting reflected fragments by giving a reduction from BVC to derivability in the
reflected fragment. Therefore, our complexity lower bounds hold for any fitting reflected logic, and they do not depend
on the particular propositional axiomatization chosen, or the particular form of the five terms from (1). In fact, as will be
shown, it is not even important that the operation+ be present.
3. Justification terms encoding propositional reasoning
Throughout the section, we assume that a reflected fragment rJLCS is fitting. All ∗-derivations in this and the next two
sections can be performed in either of the ∗-calculi. In each case, the choice of the ∗-calculus ismade based on the underlying
reflected fragment according to Table 2.
The size of terms is defined in a standard way: |c| = |x| = 1 for any constant c and any variable x, |(t · s)| = |(t + s)| =
|t| + |s| + 1, | ! t| = |t| + 1.
Note that all the terms from (1) have size O(1) because there are only five of them.
Lemma 17 (Encoding the Hypothetical Syllogism Rule). The operation
syl(t, s) = c2 · (c1 · s) · t
with |syl(t, s)| = |t| + |s| + O(1) encodes the Hypothetical Syllogism Rule, i.e.,
rJLCS ⊢ syl(t, s) :H ⇐⇒ H = A → C such that for some BrJLCS ⊢ t :(A → B) and rJLCS ⊢ s :(B → C).
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Proof. (⇐=). Here are the key elements of a derivation of t : (A → B), s : (B → C) ⊢ syl(t, s) : (A → C) (parts of the
derivation following from the ‘‘fit’’ of the reflected fragment are omitted):
c1 : ((B → C)→ (A → (B → C))) (fit)
s : (B → C) (Hyp)
c1 · s : (A → (B → C)) (∗A2)
c2 : ((A → (B → C))→ ((A → B)→ (A → C))) (fit)
c2 · (c1 · s) : ((A → B)→ (A → C)) (∗A2)
t : (A → B) (Hyp)
(c2 · (c1 · s)) · t : (A → C) (∗A2)
(=⇒). Consider an arbitrary derivation of syl(t, s) :H in the ∗-calculus. It can easily be seen that any such derivation must
have the same key elements as the one used for the⇐=-direction above: the only difference can be in the choice of formulas
for the terms c1, c2, s, and t . Since the reflected fragment is fitting, we knowwhich formulas can be proved by c1 and c2. Thus,
we can shape this as a unification problem: find formulas X1, Y1, X2, Y2, Z2, Xs, and Xt such that rJLCS ⊢ s :Xs, rJLCS ⊢ t :Xt ,
and the following is a ∗-calculus derivation of s :Xs, t :Xt ⊢ syl(t, s) :H modulo derivability of statements from (1):
1. c1 : (X1 → (Y1 → X1)) (fit)
2. s : Xs (Hyp)
3. c1 · s : (Y1 → X1) (∗A2)
4. c2 : ((X2 → (Y2 → Z2))→ ((X2 → Y2)→ (X2 → Z2))) (fit)
5. c2 · (c1 · s) : ((X2 → Y2)→ (X2 → Z2)) (∗A2)
6. t : Xt (Hyp)
7. (c2 · (c1 · s)) · t :H (∗A2)
To make the applications of the rule ∗A2 work in lines 3, 5, and 7, the unification variables have to satisfy the following
equations:
X1 = Xs from 3. (2)
X2 → (Y2 → Z2) = Y1 → X1 from 5. (3)
X2 → Y2 = Xt from 7. (4)
X2 → Z2 = H from 7. (5)
By (2) and (3), Xs = X1 = Y2 → Z2. This equation combined with (4) and (5) shows that H is indeed an implication that
follows by HS from Xt and Xs justified by t and s respectively. 
Lemma 18 (Stripping k Conjunctions). For any integer k ≥ 0 there exists a term tk of size O(k) that encodes the operation of
stripping k conjunctions, i.e.,
rJLCS ⊢ tk :D ⇐⇒ D = H → C, where C is a k-conjunct of H.
Proof. We prove by induction on k that the conditions are satisfied for
t0 = (c2 · c1) · c1,
tk+1 = syl(c∧1,∧2, tk).
Since |tk+1| = |tk| + |c∧1,∧2| + O(1) = |tk| + O(1), it is clear that |tk| = |t0| + kO(1) = O(k).
Base case, k = 0. (⇐=). If C is a 0-conjunct of H , then H = C , and it is easy to see that t0 corresponds to the standard
derivation of the tautology C → C from propositional axioms (cf. combinator skk).
(=⇒). Any ∗-derivation of t0 :Dmust have the following key elements:
1. c2 : ((X2 → (Y2 → Z2))→ ((X2 → Y2)→ (X2 → Z2))) (fit)
2. c1 : (X1 → (Y1 → X1)) (fit)
3. c2 · c1 : ((X2 → Y2)→ (X2 → Z2)) (∗A2)
4. c1 : (X3 → (Y3 → X3)) (fit)
5. (c2 · c1) · c1 :D (∗A2)
For ∗A2 from line 5 to be valid, it is necessary that D = X2 → Z2. It follows from ∗A2 in line 3 that X2 → (Y2 → Z2) = X1 →
(Y1 → X1), in which case X2 = X1 = Z2. Therefore, D = X2 → X2, which is an implication from a formula to its 0-conjunct.
Induction step. (⇐=). Let H be a formula with a (k+ 1)-conjunct C . Then H must be of the form H1 ∧ H2 with C being a
k-conjunct of Hi for some i = 1, 2. By the induction hypothesis, rJLCS ⊢ tk : (Hi → C) for this i. For both i = 1 and i = 2
rJLCS ⊢ (c∧1,∧2) :(H → Hi). Then, by Lemma 17, rJLCS ⊢ tk+1 :(H → C).
(=⇒). By the inductionhypothesis, tk justifies only implications froma formula to one of its k-conjuncts. Since rJLCS is fitting,
c∧1,∧2 justifies only implications from a formula to one of its 1-conjuncts. By Lemma 17, tk+1 justifies only hypothetical
syllogisms obtained from the latter and the former, but a k-conjunct of a 1-conjunct of a formula is its (k+ 1)-conjunct. 
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Lemma 19. For any term s and any integer l ≥ 0 there exists a term conj(s, l) of size O |s|2l with the following property:
rJLCS ⊢ conj(s, l) :D ⇐⇒ D = B → C1 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l such thatrJLCS ⊢ s :(B → Ci) for all i = 1, . . . , 2l.
Proof. We prove by induction on l that the conditions are satisfied for
conj(s, 0) = syl(s, t0),





 · conj(s, l).
It is not hard to see that |conj(s, l)| = 2l(|s| + K + L)− L, where K and L are constants such that |conj(s, 0)| = |s| + K and
|conj(s, l+ 1)| = 2|conj(s, l)| + L.
Base case, l = 0. (⇐=). For any formula C , rJLCS ⊢ t0 : (C → C) by Lemma 18. Then, by Lemma 17, rJLCS ⊢ s : (B → C)
implies rJLCS ⊢ syl(s, t0) :(B → C).
(=⇒). By Lemma 17, syl(s, t0) justifies only implications B → C for which there exists a formula A such that rJLCS ⊢ s :
(B → A) and rJLCS ⊢ t0 :(A → C). By Lemma 18, the latter implies A = C . Therefore, rJLCS ⊢ s :(B → C). 9
Induction step. (⇐=). Let H = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l+1 with rJLCS ⊢ s :(B → Ci) for all its (l+ 1)-conjuncts Ci. Then H = H1 ∧H2,
where C1, C2, . . . , C2l are l-conjuncts of H1 and C2l+1, C2l+2, . . . , C2l+1 are l-conjuncts of H2. By the induction hypothesis,
rJLCS ⊢ conj(s, l) :(B → H1), (6)
rJLCS ⊢ conj(s, l) :(B → H2). (7)
In addition, rJLCS ⊢ c∧ :(H1 → (H2 → H1 ∧ H2)); in other words,
rJLCS ⊢ c∧ :(H1 → (H2 → H)). (8)
From (8) and (6) by Lemma 17, for s′ = syl(conj(s, l), c∧)we have
rJLCS ⊢ s′ :(B → (H2 → H)).
Then, from (7) and rJLCS ⊢ c2 :((B → (H2 → H))→ ((B → H2)→ (B → H))):
rJLCS ⊢ c2 · s′ :((B → H2)→ (B → H)) and, finally,
rJLCS ⊢ (c2 · s′) · conj(s, l) :(B → H).
It remains to note that conj(s, l+ 1) = (c2 · s′) · conj(s, l).
(=⇒). By Lemma 17, the rule
t :(A → B) s :(B → C)
syl(t, s) :(A → C) (Syl)
is admissible in both ∗-calculi. So any ∗-derivation of conj(s, l + 1) : D must contain the following key elements (we have
already incorporated the induction hypothesis about conj(s, l) as well as Lemma 17):
1. conj(s, l) : (B → C1 ∧ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l) (IH)
2. c∧ : (X∧ → (Y∧ → X∧ ∧ Y∧)) (fit)
3. s′ : (B → (Y∧ → X∧ ∧ Y∧)) (Syl)
4. c2 : ((X2 → (Y2 → Z2))→ ((X2 → Y2)→ (X2 → Z2))) (fit)
5. c2 · s′ : ((X2 → Y2)→ (X2 → Z2)) (∗A2)
6. conj(s, l) : (B′ → C2l+1 ∧ C2l+2 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l+1) (IH)
7. (c2 · s′) · conj(s, l) :D (∗A2)
where rJLCS ⊢ s : (B → Ci) and rJLCS ⊢ s : (B′ → C2l+i) for i = 1, . . . , 2l. Let us collect all unification equations necessary
for this to be a valid fragment of a ∗-derivation:
C1 ∧ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l = X∧ from 3. (9)
B → (Y∧ → X∧ ∧ Y∧) = X2 → (Y2 → Z2) from 5. (10)
B′ → C2l+1 ∧ C2l+2 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l+1 = X2 → Y2 from 7. (11)
X2 → Z2 = D from 7. (12)
By (10) and (11), B = X2 = B′. Thus, rJLCS ⊢ s :(B → Ci) for i = 1, . . . , 2l+1. Also
Y∧ = Y2 = C2l+1 ∧ C2l+2 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l+1 ,
9 Note that, in general, conj(s, 0) = s does not satisfy the=⇒-direction.
896 S.R. Buss, R. Kuznets / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 888–905
again by (10) and (11). So, by (9) and (10),
Z2 = X∧ ∧ Y∧ = (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l) ∧ (C2l+1 ∧ C2l+2 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l+1).
By (12), D is indeed an implication from B to this balanced conjunction for all of whose (l+ 1)-conjuncts the term s justifies
their entailment from B. 
In the following, a 1-disjunct is defined analogously to a 1-conjunct.
Lemma 20. For the term disj = c∨1,∨2 of size O(1),
rJLCS ⊢ disj :D ⇐⇒ D = B → H, where B is a 1-disjunct of H.
Proof. Easily follows from the fact that the reflected fragment is fitting. 
4. Reduction from Vertex Cover, part I
We now use the justification terms from the previous section to build a polynomial-time many–one reduction from BVC
to a fitting reflected fragment rJLCS .





tk→l = conj(tk, l).
For any binary exponential graph G = ⟨V , E⟩ with |V | = 2k and any set C ⊆ V of size 2l,
rJLCS ⊢ tk→l :(FV → FC ).
Proof. |conj(tk, l)| = O
|tk|2l = O k2l.
All l-conjuncts pi of FC , where i ∈ C , must be k-conjuncts of FV . Thus, for any of them by Lemma 18, rJLCS ⊢ tk :(FV → pi).
Now, by Lemma 19, we have rJLCS ⊢ conj(tk, l) :(FV → FC ). 
Lemma 22. Let a term of size O(l) be defined by
tl→edge = syl(tl, disj).
For any binary exponential graph G = ⟨V , E⟩, any set C ⊆ V of size 2l, and any edge e ∈ E,
rJLCS ⊢ tl→edge :(FC → Fe) ⇐⇒ e is covered by C.
Proof. |syl(tl, disj)| = |tl| + |disj| + O(1) = O(l)+ O(1) = O(l).
(⇐=). If i ∈ e ∩ C is the vertex in C that covers e, then pi is a 1-disjunct of Fe, so rJLCS ⊢ disj : (pi → Fe) by Lemma 20. But
pi is also an l-conjunct of FC , so, by Lemma 18, rJLCS ⊢ tl :(FC → pi). Finally, rJLCS ⊢ syl(tl, disj) :(FC → Fe) by Lemma 17.
(=⇒). If C does not cover e, it is easy to see that FC → Fe is not valid propositionally. All justification logics are conservative
over classical propositional logic, therefore JLCS 0 FC → Fe. By Theorem 9, rJLCS 0 s :(FC → Fe) for any term s. 
Lemma 23. Let a term of size O (l2m) be defined by
sl→m = conj(tl→edge,m).
For any binary exponential graph G = ⟨V , E⟩ with |E| = 2m and any set C ⊆ V of size 2l,
rJLCS ⊢ sl→m :(FC → FG) ⇐⇒ C is a vertex cover for G.
Proof. |conj(tl→edge,m)| = O
|tl→edge|2m = O (l2m).
(⇐=). If C is a vertex cover, then rJLCS ⊢ tl→edge : (FC → Fe) for all e ∈ E, by Lemma 22. All m-conjuncts of FG are Fe’s with
e ∈ E. Hence, by Lemma 19, we have rJLCS ⊢ conj(tl→edge,m) :(FC → FG).
(=⇒). If C is not a vertex cover, by Lemma 15.3, formula FC → FG is not valid propositionally. The same argument as in the
previous lemma shows that, for any term s, rJLCS 0 s :(FC → FG). 
Theorem 24. Let a term of size O

k2l
+ O (l2m) be defined by
tk→l→m = syl(tk→l, sl→m).
For any binary exponential graph G = ⟨V , E⟩ with |V | = 2k and |E| = 2m and any integer 0 ≤ l ≤ k,
G has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l =⇒ rJLCS ⊢ tk→l→m :(FV → FG).




By Lemma 21, rJLCS ⊢ tk→l :(FV → FC ) for any set C ⊆ V of size 2l. If G has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l, it can be enlarged
to a vertex cover of size 2l. Let C be such a vertex cover of size 2l. Then, by Lemma 23, rJLCS ⊢ sl→m : (FC → FG). Thus, by
Lemma 17, rJLCS ⊢ syl(tk→l, sl→m) :(FV → FG). 
Note that the term tk→l→m depends only on size 2l of a vertex cover and on how many vertices and edges G has.
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5. Reduction from vertex cover, part II
To finish the polynomial-time reduction from BVC to any fitting reflected fragment rJLCS it now remains to prove the
other direction:
rJLCS ⊢ tk→l→m :(FV → FG) =⇒ G has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l.
Lemma 25 (Converse to Lemma 21).
rJLCS ⊢ tk→l :H =⇒
H = B → D,
where D is a balanced conjunction of depth≥ l
whose all l-conjuncts are k-conjuncts of B.
Proof. By definition, tk→l = conj(tk, l), so by Lemma 19, it justifies only implications B → C1 ∧ · · · ∧ C2l with rJLCS ⊢ tk :
(B → Ci) for i = 1, . . . , 2l. By Lemma 18, the term tk justifies only implications from a formula to its k-conjuncts. 
Lemma 26 (Converse to Lemma 22).
rJLCS ⊢ tl→edge :H =⇒ H = B → D1 ∨ D2,where either D1 or D2 is an l-conjunct of B.
Proof. By definition, tl→edge = syl(tl, disj). By Lemma 17,H can only be an implication B → D such that rJLCS ⊢ tl :(B → C)
and rJLCS ⊢ disj : (C → D) for some formula C . By Lemma 20, the latter statement implies that D = D1 ∨ D2 with C = Di
for some i = 1, 2. By Lemma 18, Di is an l-conjunct of B. 
Lemma 27 (Converse to Lemma 23).
rJLCS ⊢ sl→m :H =⇒
H = B → (C1 ∨ D1) ∧ · · · ∧ (C2m ∨ D2m),
where either Ci or Di is an l-conjunct of B
for each i = 1, . . . , 2m.
Proof. By definition, sl→m = conj(tl→edge,m). By Lemma 19, H must be an implication from some formula B to a balanced
conjunction of depth ≥ m such that, for all its m-conjuncts F , rJLCS ⊢ tl→edge : (B → F). By Lemma 26, each of these
m-conjuncts must be a disjunction with one of its 1-disjuncts being an l-conjunct of B. 
Theorem 28 (Converse to Theorem 24).
rJLCS ⊢ tk→l→m :H =⇒
H = B → (C1 ∨ D1) ∧ · · · ∧ (C2m ∨ D2m)
and there is a size≤ 2l set X of k-conjuncts of B
with either Ci ∈ X or Di ∈ X for each i = 1, . . . , 2m.
Proof. By definition, tk→l→m = syl(tk→l, sl→m). By Lemma 17, H = B → F with (a) rJLCS ⊢ tk→l : (B → Q ),
(b) rJLCS ⊢ sl→m : (Q → F) for some formula Q . From (a), by Lemma 25, Q must be a conjunction Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q2l such
that all its l-conjuncts Qi are also k-conjuncts of B. So the set X = {Qi | i = 1, . . . , 2l} has size ≤ 2l (because of possible
repetitions) and consists of k-conjuncts of B. It now follows from (b), by Lemma27, that F = (C1∨D1)∧· · ·∧(C2m∨D2m)with
either Ci or Di being an l-conjunct of Q for each i = 1, . . . , 2m, i.e., with either Ci ∈ X or Di ∈ X for each i = 1, . . . , 2m. 
Theorem 29. For any binary exponential graph G = ⟨V , E⟩ with |V | = 2k and |E| = 2m and any integer 0 ≤ l ≤ k,
rJLCS ⊢ tk→l→m :(FV → FG) ⇐⇒ G has a vertex cover of size≤ 2l.
Proof. The ⇐=-direction was proved in Theorem 24. We now prove the =⇒-direction. FV → FG already has the form
prescribed by Theorem 28. The only k-conjuncts of FV are the sentence letters p1, . . . , p2k . Therefore, theremust exist a set X
of ≤ 2l of these sentence letters such that for each m-conjunct Fe of FG at least one of the 1-disjuncts of Fe, i.e., either pv1(e)
or pv2(e), is in X . This literally means that G has a set of≤ 2l vertices that covers all the edges of G. 
6. Lower bounds for reflected fragments
Theorem 30. For any fitting reflected fragment rJLCS , derivability in rJLCS is NP-hard.
Proof. It is easy to see that both FV and FG have size polynomial in the size of G. As for the term tk→l→m, it was shown in
Theorem 24 that |tk→l→m| = O

k2l
+ O (l2m), which is polynomial in the size of G provided l ≤ k (BVC for l > k is trivial).
Thus, Theorem 29 shows that rJLCS is NP-hard. 
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It is time now to reap the fruits of the preceding theorem by showing that awide range of constant specifications produce
fitting reflected fragments.
In the following proof, we need to perform operations on schemes of formulas rather than on individual formulas. Thus,




where σ is any substitution of formulas for sentence letters (see, for instance, the formulation of classical propositional logic
in [14, Section 1.3]). In justification logics, we additionally have to allow substitutions σ to replace justification variables
with justification terms.
The Substitution Rule allows to make axiomatizations finite because each axiom scheme can be replaced by a single
axiom A such that each of infinitely many instances of the axiom scheme is a substitution instance of A. Note that in general
we cannot use this representation to define JLCS because CS need not be schematic. It is easy to see that
Lemma 31 (Substitution Property, [3–5]). The Substitution Rule is admissible for a justification logic JLCS , and hence for rJLCS ,
iff CS is schematic.
Strictly speaking, we presented axiom schemes (e.g., for LP) using variables over formulas and variables over terms, e.g.,
t : F → F is understood in the sense that it is an axiom for any term t and any formula F . Each axiom scheme written in
this way can be easily converted to an axiom in the corresponding system with the Substitution Rule by replacing distinct
variables over formulas by distinct sentence letters and distinct variables over terms by distinct justification variables,
e.g., the scheme t : F → F becomes a formula x : p → p. The latter will be called a most general instance (mgi) of the
former (note that an mgi is not unique: the choice of sentence letters and justification variables plays no role).
By analogy with axiom schemes, a scheme of formulaswith an mgi F is the set
{Fσ | σ is a substitution}.
Lemma 32. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, TnLP,S4nLP,S5nLP}. Any schematically injective and axiomatically appropriate
constant specification CS for JL yields a fitting reflected fragment rJLCS .
Proof. All formulas that fit the five patterns from (1) can be broken into seven schemes of propositional tautologies
with mgi’s
p → (q → p), (13)
(p → (q → r))→ ((p → q)→ (p → r)), (14)
p1 ∧ p2 → p1, (15)
p1 ∧ p2 → p2, (16)
p → (q → p ∧ q), (17)
p1 → p1 ∨ p2, (18)
p2 → p1 ∨ p2, (19)
where p, q, r , p1, and p2 are distinct sentence letters (strictly speaking, we should have used a distinct set of sentence letters
for each mgi). Let A stand for any of these seven mgi’s. For each JL, its axiomatization contains A1, i.e., a full axiomatization
of classical propositional logic. Therefore, the propositional tautology A is a theorem of JLCS . Since CS is axiomatically
appropriate, by Lemma4, there exists a term s, which contains neither+nor any justification variables, such that JLCS ⊢ s :A,
and hence rJLCS ⊢ s : A. By the Substitution Property (Lemma 31), rJLCS ⊢ s : (Aσ) for any substitution σ . In other words,
the term s satisfies (1) in the⇐=-direction for the respective axiom scheme.
For the=⇒-direction, it is sufficient to note that for any+-free ground term t the set
CS(t) = {F | rJLCS ⊢ t :F}
is either empty or a scheme whose mgi we will denote by At . This statement can be proved by induction on the size of t . For
constants, it is guaranteed by the schematic injectivity ofCS. Justification variables do not occur in ground terms. IfCS(t ′) is
empty, so is CS(! t ′). Otherwise,
• for logics with ∗!CS as their ∗-calculus,
CS(! t ′) = {t ′ :F | F ∈ CS(t ′)} =IH {t ′ :(At ′σ) | σ is a substitution} = {(t ′ :At ′)σ | σ is a substitution}. (20)
The last equality follows from the fact that t ′ does not contain variables. Thus, in this case A! t ′ = t ′ :At ′ .
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• In the logics with ∗CS as their ∗-calculus, for t ′ = ! · · · !
n
c , n ≥ 0,
CS(! ! · · · !
n
c) = {! ! · · · !  
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A | c :A ∈ CS}
= {! ! · · · !  
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :(Acσ) | σ is a substitution}
= {(! ! · · · !  
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :Ac)σ | σ is a substitution},
so that A! · · · !
n+1
c = ! ! · · · !  
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :Ac , where the existence of Ac is guaranteed by the schematic injectivity of CS.
For all other terms, CS(! t ′) = ∅ independent of CS(t ′).
Finally,
CS(t1 · t2) = {G | (∃F)(F → G ∈ CS(t1) and F ∈ CS(t2))}
=IH {G | (∃F)(∃σ1)(∃σ2)(F → G = At1σ1 and F = At2σ2)}. (21)
It follows from Theorem 9 that At1 cannot be a single sentence letter. Clearly, if the main connective of At1 is not an
implication, then CS(t1 · t2) = ∅. It remains to consider the case At1 = B → C . If B cannot be unified with At2 , then
CS(t1 · t2) = ∅. Otherwise, there must exist a most common unifier (mgu) τ = mgu(B, At2). Any formula F in (21) must be
a substitution instance of both B and At2 . Hence there must exist a substitution σ such that F = Bτσ = At2τσ . Accordingly,
any formula G ∈ CS(t1 · t2)must have the form Cτσ . It follows that CS(t1 · t2) = {Cτσ | σ is a substitution}. Thus, in this
case, At1·t2 = Cτ = C mgu(B, At2). Clearly, the operation+, which enables us to combine several different schemes, would
have broken this pattern, but it does not occur in t .
Thus, our term smust justify some scheme, of which the formula A is an instance, i.e., A = Asσ for some substitution σ .
It can be checked that, if Bσ = A and B is a tautology, then B = A. Hence, As = A by Theorem 9.
Therefore, the ground term s justifies exactly the scheme with mgi A. This discussion shows that there exist terms c1, c2,
and c∧ that justify exactly the schemes with mgi’s (13), (14), and (17) respectively, as well as terms c∧1, c∧2, c∨1, and c∨2
for the schemes with mgi’s (15), (16), (18), and (19) respectively. It remains to note that the term c∨1 + c∨2 satisfies all the
requirements of c∨1,∨2 and the term c∧1 + c∧2 fits the role of c∧1,∧2. 
Theorem 33. Let CS be a schematically injective and axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4,
JD4, LP, TnLP,S4nLP,S5nLP}. Then derivability in rJLCS is NP-complete.
Proof. It was proved in [18,21] that rJLCS is in NP. By Lemma 32, rJLCS is fitting. Thus, by Theorem 29, rJLCS is NP-hard. 
7. Reflected justification logics with hypotheses
The goal of this section is to extend the ∗-calculi to situations where rJL is augmented with additional axioms. This will
be important for the proof of Theorem 44 in the next section that shows theΠp2 -hardness of the Derivability Problems for
pure justification logics.
Some proofs in this section will be semantic. Accordingly, we introduce the simplest semantics for pure justification
logics, that of symbolicmodels, also calledMkrtychevmodels or simplyM-models. This semantics was first introduced for LP
by Alexey Mkrtychev in [25] and extended to other pure justification logics in [19].
Definition 34. Let CS be a constant specification for a pure justification logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}. An M-model
for JLCS is a pairM = ⟨V ,A⟩, whereV is a propositional valuation andA is an admissible evidence function for JLCS . Informally,
an admissible evidence function specifies for each term t and formula F whether t is considered admissible evidence for F .
If A(t, F) = True, we say that A satisfies t : F . Being satisfied by A is one of the criteria necessary for t : F to hold in an
M-model.
Formally, a functionA : Tm× Fm → {True, False} is called an admissible evidence function for a justification logic JLCS iff
it is closed under deduction in the ∗-calculus for the reflected fragment rJLCS (see Table 2). That is to say, if an admissible
evidence function A satisfies a set X of justification assertions and X ⊢∗ s : G in the respective ∗-calculus, then A must
also satisfy s : G. In addition, if JL ∈ {JD, JD4}, an admissible evidence function for JLCS must satisfy the following
condition: A(t,⊥) = False for all terms t . We will use A(t, F) as an abbreviation for A(t, F) = True and also ¬A(t, F)
as an abbreviation forA(t, F) = False.10
10 N. Krupski and Mkrtychev used the notation F ∈ ∗(t) instead ofA(t, F) and F /∈ ∗(t) instead of ¬A(t, F).
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Finally, the truth relationM  H is defined as follows:
M  P iff V (P) = True;
Boolean connectives behave classically;
M  t :F iff

M  F andA(t, F) if JL ∈ {JT, LP},
A(t, F) if JL ∈ {J, JD, J4, JD4}.
Let CS be a constant specification for a pure justification logic JL and Γ be any set of formulas. We write JLCS{Γ } to
denote the closure of JLCS ∪ Γ under modus ponens. It is easy to verify that the deduction theorem holds for JLCS , and
hence we have that
JLCS{Γ } ⊢ A iff there exists a finite set Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that JLCS ⊢

Γ0 → A.
Definition 35. Suppose that every formula in Γ has the form t :A, i.e., Γ consists only of justification assertions. We define
the following calculi:
∗CS+Γ = ∗CS + Γ and ∗!CS+Γ = ∗!CS + Γ . (22)
That is to say, in each case the set of axioms is extended by all justification assertions from Γ while the rules remain the
same and can be freely applied to the new axioms. When the type of a ∗-calculus and a particular CS are clear from the
context or when they can be arbitrary, we will use the term ∗Γ -calculus.
It is natural to ask whether a given ∗Γ -calculus can prove every formula in the reflected fragment of JLCS{Γ } for the
respective JLCS . Unfortunately, there are cases where this does not hold. As an example from Kuznets [21], consider the
situation for LPCS where Γ = {c : p, c : ¬p}. Then, via the Factivity Axiom, LPCS{Γ } is inconsistent, whereas there are
certainly justification assertions that cannot be proved in the ∗!CS+Γ -calculus. Thus, we need additional restrictions on Γ .
For this, we introduce the following
Definition 36. A set of justification assertions Γ is called factive provided that, whenever t : A ∈ Γ , either (a) A is of the
form s :B and A ∈ Γ or (b) A is a purely propositional11 formula. The set of purely propositional formulas A such that t :A ∈ Γ
for some term t is called the propositional content of Γ , and is denoted Prop(Γ ). We call a factive set Γ consistent provided
Prop(Γ ) is (propositionally) consistent.
The next theorem generalizes N. Krupski’s Theorem 5.1 from [18].
Theorem 37. Let Γ be a consistent factive set of justification assertions andCS be a constant specification for a pure justification
logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}. Then, for any formula of the form t :F , we have
JLCS{Γ } ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ ⊢∗Γ t :F
for the respective ∗Γ -calculus.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1 from [18], which in turn uses constructions of Mkrtychev [25]. The
⇐=-direction follows from the fact that any ∗Γ -derivation can be easily converted into a derivation in JLCS{Γ }. Indeed,
all axioms of the ∗Γ -calculus are either instances of axiom internalization in JLCS or members of Γ and hence axioms
of JLCS{Γ }. Each rule in ∗Γ -calculus translates into the corresponding axiom of JL followed by one or two applications of
modus ponens.
We prove the =⇒-direction by showing its contrapositive. Suppose ∗Γ 0 t : F . Let the function AΓ : Tm × Fm →
{True, False} be defined by
AΓ (s,G)⇐⇒ ∗Γ ⊢ s :G.
For JL ∈ {J, JD, JT}, whereby ∗Γ = ∗CS+Γ , it is clear that AΓ is an admissible evidence function for JTCS; similarly,
for JL ∈ {J4, JD4, LP}, when ∗Γ = ∗!CS+Γ , we have that AΓ is an admissible evidence function for LPCS . Note that any
constant specification for J or JD can also serve as a constant specification for JT because all axioms of J and JD are also
axioms of JT. Similarly, if a constant specification can be used for J4 or JD4, it can also be used for LP. In either case, by
definitionAΓ satisfies all justification assertions from Γ but does not satisfy t :F by our assumption.
SinceΓ is consistent, there exists a propositional valuation V that satisfies Prop(Γ ). Consider theM-modelM = ⟨V ,AΓ ⟩
for JTCS or for LPCS respectively. Note thatM 2 t :F since¬AΓ (t, F). In addition, for either JTCS or LPCS we can prove that
M  Γ . Indeed, it is easy to show by induction on k thatM  sk : . . . : s1 :G for each sk : . . . : s1 :G ∈ Γ , where G is a purely
propositional formula. The base case, k = 1, follows from G ∈ Prop(Γ ).
The existence of a JTCS-model (an LPCS-model) where all formulas from Γ hold while t : F is false shows that
JTCS{Γ } 0 t :F (respectively LPCS{Γ } 0 t :F ). But every JCS- or JDCS-derivation is also a JTCS-derivation (for the sameCS);
similarly, any J4CS- or JD4CS-derivation is also an LPCS-derivation. Hence JLCS{Γ } 0 t : F . This completes the proof of
Theorem 37. 
11 A purely propositional formula is one that does not contain any justification terms.
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By analogy with rJLCS we will denote the reflected fragment of JLCS{Γ }
rJLCS{Γ } = {t :F | JLCS{Γ } ⊢ t :F}.
Aswe proved, rJLCS{Γ } is axiomatized by its respective ∗Γ -calculus. Note that the only difference between a ∗-calculus and
its corresponding ∗Γ -calculus is the addition of axioms Γ . Therefore, a reflected fragment rJLCS{Γ } is axiomatized by the
same ∗-calculus as rJLCS as far as rules are concerned. Consequently, there are still only two sets of rules chosen based on
whether full positive introspection holds in JL. The differences between these ∗-calculi, as in the case of rJLCS , is in their
axioms.
As a consequence of the above construction, other results that N. Krupski [18] established for LPCS also hold for JLCS{Γ }.
First, by the minimality of the admissible evidence functionAΓ , the disjunction property for formulas of the form s :F ∨ t :G
holds for JLCS{Γ } (cf. Corollary 2 of [18]). Similarly, ifCS is schematic (and polynomially decidable) and Γ is finite, then the
Derivability Problem for a ∗Γ -calculus is in NP for either of the calculi, i.e., rJLCS{Γ } is in NP. This is proved by a construction
similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem5.2 in [18], themain difference being that derivations in rJLCS{Γ } correspond
to rJLCS-derivations from hypotheses Γ , whereas N. Krupski considered only derivations without hypotheses.
For us, the importance of Theorem 37 lies in the fact that the results of Sections 3–5 translate to rJLCS{Γ } for a proper
subclass of consistent factive sets Γ .
Lemma 38. Let CS be a constant specification for a pure justification logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} such that the reflected
fragment rJLCS is fitting. Let Γ be a consistent factive set of justification assertions such that the only terms that occur in Γ are
justification variables. Then Lemmas 17–20, 22, 23, 26 and 27 all still hold if rJLCS is uniformly replaced by rJLCS{Γ } in the
statements of the lemmas.
Proof. Since any derivation in rJLCS is also a derivation in rJLCS{Γ }, the proofs of the⇐=-directions in all these lemmas
do not require any changes. The =⇒-directions also hold because the only terms that gain additional provably justified
formulas in rJLCS{Γ } are those that contain justification variables from Γ , but no variables have been used for construction
of the terms in the proofs of all these lemmas. 
8. A lower bound for full justification logics
Sections 4 and 5 established a reduction from the Vertex Cover Problem to the Derivability Problem in a given reflected
fragment thereby proving NP-hardness of the latter. In the present section, we extend the proof method and obtain
stronger lower bounds for full (non-reflected) pure justification logics JLCS .12 We first prove that a quantified version of
the Vertex Cover Problem isΠp2 -hard by reducing co-QSAT2 to it. Then we reduce this Quantified Vertex Cover Problem to
the Derivability Problem in a given justification logic.
Definition 39. By co-QSAT2 we mean the following problem. Let ϕ be any 3CNF formula, i.e., a propositional formula in
conjunctive normal form with exactly three literals in each clause. Given such a ϕ with its sentence letters partitioned into
two sets p⃗ = {p1, . . . , p|p⃗ |} and q⃗ = {q1, . . . , q|q⃗ |}, determine whether
ψ = (∀p1) · · · (∀p|p⃗ |)(∃q1) · · · (∃q|q⃗ |)ϕ (23)
is true.
The following theorem is standard. Several of its slightly different variants can be found, for instance, in [26–28].
Theorem 40. co-QSAT2 isΠ
p
2 -complete.
Letψ = (∀p⃗ )(∃q⃗ )(C1∧ · · ·∧Cr) be a formula of type (23), where each Ci is a 3-clause: Ci = Li,1∨ Li,2∨ Li,3, i = 1, . . . , r .
Each literal Li,z must be pj, ¬pj, qj, or ¬qj for some j.
Given ψ we construct a graph Gψ = ⟨Vψ , Eψ ⟩ with vertices labeled by literals (the construction is identical with the
reduction of 3SAT to VC as given in [17]). The graph is defined as follows:
• For each clause Ci, i = 1, . . . , r , inψ we have a triangle of pairwise joined vertices ci,1, ci,2, and ci,3 in Gψ . Each vertex ci,z
is labeled by the corresponding literal Li,z . These are called clause vertices and clause edges.
• For each sentence letter qj, there are two vertices vj,0 and vj,1 joined by an edge. The vertex vj,0 is labeled with qj and
vj,1 is labeled with ¬qj. These are called literal vertices and literal edges.
• For each sentence letter pj, there are two vertices uj,0 and uj,1 joined by an edge. The vertex uj,0 is labeled with pj and uj,1
is labeled with ¬pj. These are also called literal vertices and literal edges.
• A clause vertex and a literal vertex are joined by a connecting edge iff they are labeled by the same literal.
12 Applying this method to hybrid logics does not make sense since they are mostly at least PSPACE-hard by virtue of being conservative over the
corresponding modal logic. As for S51LP, the only hybrid logic that may not be PSPACE-hard, its conservativity over LPwould easily yield the lower bound
that can be obtained by our method.
902 S.R. Buss, R. Kuznets / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 888–905
There are 3r + 2N vertices in Gψ , where N = |p⃗ | + |q⃗ |; namely, 3r clause vertices and 2N literal vertices. Similarly, there
are 6r + N edges in Gψ ; namely, 3r clause edges, N literal edges, and 3r connecting edges.
As is argued in [17], Gψ has a vertex cover of size≤ 2r + N iff ϕ is satisfiable. First, any vertex cover of Gψ must have at
least 2r+N vertices since a vertex cover must contain at least one vertex for each literal edge and at least two vertices from
each clause triangle. Second, since any vertex cover C of size 2r + N must contain exactly one literal vertex per literal edge
in the graph, it is possible to define a propositional valuation τC by letting τC (L) = True for exactly those literals that label
literal vertices from the vertex cover. It is not hard to see that this valuation τC satisfies ϕ. Conversely, if τ is any valuation
that satisfies ϕ, then there exists a vertex cover C of size 2r + N such that τ = τC .
Definition 41. Let π denote a (partial) valuation with domain p⃗. A vertex cover C of Gψ is called its π-cover if C contains
all literal vertices labeled by literals from the set
{pj | π(pj) = True} ∪ {¬pj | π(pj) = False}.
The above discussion yields the following proposition.
Proposition 42. A sentenceψ as in (23) is true iff for every valuationπ with domain p⃗, the graph Gψ has aπ-cover of size 2r+N.
In order to work with balanced conjunctions, we modify Gψ to transform the questions about the existence of π-
covers into Binary Vertex Cover Problems. For this, we construct a graph G′ψ that has the following properties: (a) G′ψ has
2k + 2|p⃗ | vertices, (b) G′ψ has 2m edges, (c) the sought-for π-covers have size 2l, and (d) the size of G′ψ is linear in the size
of ψ . In effect, G′ψ is a binary exponential graph, except that the vertices uj,0 and uj,1, labeled pj and ¬pj respectively, are
not counted. The construction of G′ψ from Gψ mimics that from the proof of Theorem 13: to ensure (c), add extra pairs of
vertices joined by edges; to ensure (b), add a ‘‘star’’-shape as in Stage 2 of the proof of Theorem 13; then, to ensure (a), add
extra isolated vertices. By construction, Proposition 42 now implies the following property of G′ψ :
Proposition 43. A sentence ψ as in (23) is true iff for every valuation π with domain p⃗, the graph G′ψ has a π-cover of size 2l.
We are now ready to prove theΠp2 -hardness of the Derivability Problem for JLCS .
Theorem 44. LetCS be a constant specification for a pure justification logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} such that the reflected
fragment rJLCS is fitting. Then the Derivability Problem for JLCS isΠ
p
2 -hard.
Proof. We prove the theorem by reduction from co-QSAT2. Given a formula ψ as in (23), we construct the graph G′ψ as
described above and apply to this graph the encoding from Definition 14. We define a set Γψ of formulas by
Γψ = {x :pj ∨ x :pj | j = 1, . . . , |p⃗ |},
where pj is a sentence letter that corresponds to the literal vertex uj,0 and pj is a sentence letter that corresponds to the
literal vertex uj,1. Intuitively, the sentence letter pj in the encoding corresponds to the literal pj in the formula ψ while
the sentence letter pj corresponds to the literal ¬pj, which explains the chosen notation. We hope that the resulting small
collision of notation— pj is the sentence letter that encodes the literal vertex that corresponds to the literal pj —will facilitate
understanding rather than hinder it.
Let γψ be the conjunction of the formulas in Γψ . (Unlike the other conjunctions we work with, γψ need not be balanced.)
Let V ′ψ be the set of all vertices of G′ψ , and let V ′′ψ = V ′ψ \ {uj,0, uj,1 | j = 1, . . . , |p⃗ |}. Note that |V ′′ψ | = 2k is a power of two.
We define Kψ to be
Kψ = γψ → t ′k→l→m :(FV ′′ψ → FG′ψ ),
where a term t ′k→l→m plays a role similar to tk→l→m and is defined below. To prove Theorem 44 it will suffice to show that
JLCS ⊢ Kψ iff ψ is true.
By the deduction theorem, JLCS ⊢ Kψ iff
JLCS{Γψ } ⊢ t ′k→l→m :(FV ′′ψ → FG′ψ ). (24)
For any valuation π with domain p⃗, define
Vπ = {pj | π(pj) = True} ∪ {pj | π(pj) = False}
and let Γψ,π be the set of formulas {x : L | L ∈ Vπ }. Note that for any valuation π with domain p⃗ the set Γψ,π is a finite
consistent factive set of justification assertions and the only term that occurs in it is the justification variable x. Hence, by
Lemma38, for any valuationπ with domain p⃗, Lemmas 17–20, 22, 23, 26 and 27 hold for JLCS{Γψ,π }. Consider the assertions
JLCS{Γψ,π } ⊢ t ′k→l→m :(FV ′′ψ → FG′ψ ). (25)
Clearly, (24) holds iff (25) holds for all π . Thus, by Theorem 37 and Proposition 43, in order to prove Theorem 44, it will
suffice to prove the following
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Lemma 45. For all valuations π with domain p⃗,
rJLCS{Γψ,π } ⊢ t ′k→l→m :(FV ′′ψ → FG′ψ ) ⇐⇒ G′ψ has a π-cover of size 2l,
where by the derivability in rJLCS{Γψ,π } we understand the derivability in the corresponding ∗Γψ,π -calculus.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is very much like the proof of Theorem 29, but we still need to define the term t ′k→l→m. First,
let t ′k→l be the term conj(tk + c1 ·x, l). By almost exactly the same reasoning as in Lemma 21, for any set C of size 2l with
C ⊆ V ′′ψ ∪ Vπ
rJLCS{Γψ,π } ⊢ t ′k→l :(FV ′′ψ → FC ). (26)
Indeed, by Lemma 18, rJLCS ⊢ tk :(FV ′′ψ → L) for any sentence letter L that corresponds to a vertex from V ′′ψ . It is easy to see
that rJLCS{Γψ,π } ⊢ c1 ·x :(FV ′′ψ → L) for any L ∈ Vπ because rJLCS ⊢ c1 :(L → (FV ′′ψ → L)). Thus, (26) follows by Lemma 19.
The converse is proved in a way similar to Lemma 25. In particular, by Lemma 19, rJLCS{Γψ,π } ⊢ t ′k→l :H holds precisely
for formulas H of the form B → D, where D is a balanced conjunction of depth ≥ l such that for every l-conjunct Ci of D
we have rJLCS{Γψ,π } ⊢ (tk + c1 ·x) : (B → Ci). By Lemma 18, the term tk only justifies implications from a formula to its
k-conjunct. Clearly, c1 ·x only justifies implications Y → Lwith L ∈ Vπ . Therefore,
all l-conjuncts of D that are not in Vπ must be k-conjuncts of B. (27)





Now define t ′k→l→m to be the term syl(t
′
k→l, sl→m). By exactly the same argument as in Theorem 24, using the same Lem-
mas 17 and 23, with (26) replacing the claim of Lemma 21, we have
G′ψ has a π-cover of size≤ 2l ≤ |V ′ψ | =⇒ rJLCS{Γψ,π } ⊢ t ′k→l→m :(FV ′′ψ → FG′ψ ).
Conversely, Theorem 28 holds for rJLCS{Γψ,π } in place of rJLCS , except that now the set X can contain sentence let-
ters L ∈ Vπ in addition to k-conjuncts of B. Indeed, Lemmas 17 and 27 hold for rJLCS{Γψ,π }. The claim of Lemma 25 is here
replaced by (27), which allows elements of Vπ in X along with k-conjuncts of B.
Lemma 45 now follows by exactly the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 29. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 44. 
Theorem 46. Let CS be a schematically injective and axiomatically appropriate constant specification for a pure justification
logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}. Then the Derivability Problem for JLCS isΠp2 -hard.
Proof. By Lemma 32, rJLCS is fitting. Thus, by Theorem 44, JLCS isΠ
p
2 -hard. 
Theorem 47. Let CS be a schematically injective and axiomatically appropriate constant specification for a pure justification
logic JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}. Then the Derivability Problem for JLCS isΠp2 -complete.
Proof. It was proved in [19,21,1] that JLCS is inΠ
p
2 . On the other hand, theΠ
p
2 -hardness follows from Theorem 46. 
The lower bound from Theorem 46 was first proved for LPCS by Milnikel in [24]. A slightly stronger result can be found
there for J4CS: it is Π
p
2 -hard for any schematic and axiomatically appropriate CS. The results for the other four logics are
new. By analogy with Milnikel’s result for J4CS , we conjecture that the requirement of schematic injectivity in Theorem 46
for JCS can be relaxed to that of schematicness.
9. The role of CS
Our method for proving lower bounds for both justification logics and their reflected fragments as well as Milnikel’s
original proof of the lower bound for LPCS from [24] requireCS to be axiomatically appropriate and schematically injective.
A natural question arises: whether these two conditions on CS are essential for proving the lower bounds? In particular, is
LP itselfΠp2 -hard? Although we cannot answer the latter question, in this section we will try to explore the dependency of
the lower bound on a constant specification.
It is clear that neither schematic injectivity nor axiomatic appropriateness are necessary for the lower bounds to hold. In
particular,
Lemma 48. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, TnLP,S4nLP,S5nLP}. There exists a constant specificationCS for JL that is neither
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Proof. Let terms c1, c2, c∧1,∧2, c∧, and c∨1,∨2 from (1) be constants. Let all tautologies from the right sides of the five
equivalencies in (1) be axioms fromA1. Finally, let a constant specificationCS be such that all five equivalencies from (1) hold
while no other constant justifies any axioms at all. Then the reflected fragment rJLCS is clearly fitting. Thus, by Theorem 30,
rJLCS is NP-hard. In addition, if JL is a pure justification logic, by Theorem 44, JLCS is Π
p
2 -hard. At the same time, this CS
is surely not axiomatically appropriate. It is not schematically injective either since constants c∧1,∧2 and c∨1,∨2 justify two
axiom schemes each.
The constructed constant specification is schematic, but even the schematicness condition is easy to violate provided the
constants c1, c2, c∧1,∧2, c∧, and c∨1,∨2 remain schematic. It should be noted that schematicness is often needed to prove the
matching upper bound. 
The constant specification from the proof of the previous lemma also demonstrates another curious fact: the+-operation
does not play a big role in the lower bound on the complexity of the logic.
Lemma 49. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, TnLP,S4nLP,S5nLP}. There exists a constant specificationCS such that the+-free
reflected fragment of JLCS is NP-hard.
Proof. Although+was used to construct terms c∧1,∧2 and c∨1,∨2 for schematically injective constant specifications, it is not
required for the constant specificationCS from the proof of Lemma48. Nowhere else in our reductionwas+used. Therefore,
even if axiom A3 and rule ∗A3 are omitted from the axiomatizations of JL and of its reflected fragment respectively and
the operation + is dropped from the language completely (see [15] for precise definitions) the resulting +-free reflected
fragment is still fitting and, hence, NP-hard. 
However, the ability of one term to justify several axiom schemes does seem to be necessary for the proven lower bounds.
This ability can be ensured already on the level of constants, without the use of +. However, if the lack of + is coupled
with the schematic injectivity of a constant specification, then all terms effectively become schematically injective and the
reflected fragment is polynomially decidable, which can be shown by analyzing N. Krupski’s algorithm from [18].
The preceding discussion shows that the lower bounds are, in some sense, local. Namely, they can be ensured by finitely
many constants using only a small portion of propositional reasoning. In fact, the proof of the existence of undecidable LPCS
from [20] has a similar flavor: only a few constants are sufficient to make the logic undecidable. For instance, it is possible
that JLCS can be shown to beΠ
p
2 -hard using one part of the constant specification CS and to be undecidable using another
part. Therefore, the requirements of schematicness and/or schematic injectivity can be relaxed to apply only to a small subset
of justification constants.
Since axiomatic appropriateness is also a local property, it becomes clear that it is independent of whether the reflected
fragment is fitting. In particular, Lemma48 can be easily reformulated for an axiomatically appropriate but not schematically
injective constant specification. The only change in the proof would be an addition of a sixth constant that proves all the
axioms.
However little of internalization is used in the proof of our lower bounds, it cannot be dispensed of completely:
Lemma 50. Let JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, TnLP,S4nLP,S5nLP}. There exists a schematically injective but not axiomatically
appropriate constant specification CS for JL such that rJLCS is in P. If JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, LP}, then, in addition, JLCS is in co-NP.
Proof. It has been known that LP0 with the empty constant specification CS = ∅ is in co-NP. Its reflected fragment is
trivially in P since it is empty. Extending these results to other justification logics is straightforward. 
The preceding lemma can also be proved using a non-empty schematically injective constant specification, but the proof
is much more involved.
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